Tag Archives: milk price

Imagine if dairy farmers were paid like Qld cane growers

QSL

Most Australian dairy farmers have just one customer for our milk – the processor. It is the processor who adds value to the raw milk, who markets it and, importantly, it is the processor who decides how much the farmer will be paid.

I don’t need to tell you how vulnerable this leaves us.

If the processor makes a mistake or suffers any form of economic headwind – whether it be increased gas prices or decreased whole milk powder prices – it is free to simply pass that problem on to the farmer.

We accept this state of affairs because we feel there is little choice. We can’t store milk on the farm for more than two days and it’s illegal to sell unprocessed milk directly.

Cane growers have a lot in common with dairy farmers

Cane growers are in much the same boat. Like us, they cannot store their produce for long (it needs to be processed within eight hours of being harvested) and can’t sell it directly. But rather than having a handful of processors nearby – as most (though certainly not all) dairy farmers do – many are only in a workable distance from just one miller.

Cane growers use millers as service providers, not just customers

Unlike us, though, Queensland cane growers are determined to row their own boat.

As Queensland Sugar Limited’s Cathy Kelly told Milk Maid Marian, how much Queensland cane growers are paid for their crop is based on the sugar produced from their cane, rather than the cane itself.

“This payment arrangement is detailed in the Cane Supply Agreements growers hold with their local sugar mill, with the miller generally taking one-third of the sugar produced from each grower’s cane as a processing fee, leaving the grower to make the pricing decisions for, and receive payment on, the other two-thirds of the sugar,” Cathy says.

“So, while the growers may not own the sugar produced by their local mill, they are deemed to have an ‘economic interest’ in it.  It is this – the Grower’s Economic Interest in sugar (GEI Sugar) – that is at the heart of the recent sugar marketing issue.”

Cane growers can market sugar collectively
While the sugar is processed by private millers, the two-thirds of the refined sugar in which growers have an economic interest isn’t necessarily marketed by the millers.

After numerous government investigations at a state and federal level (sound familiar?), the Queensland Parliament introduced Marketing Choice legislation in December 2015, forcing Queensland sugar millers to provide their growers with a choice of marketer. It’s been a success, despite the best efforts of the biggest miller of Australian sugar cane, Singaporean-based Wilmar, to stymie arrangements as recently as last week.

Growers have access to their own not-for-profit public company, Queensland Sugar Limited (QSL), which is owned by Queensland growers and millers and started life back in 1923 as the Sugar Board, selling sugar from Queensland farmers under a single desk arrangement.

Today QSL, Cathy Kelly explains, provides four major areas of service:

Pricing: QSL is a member of the global raw sugar marketplace, the #ICE 11 exchange, based in New York. QSL uses its membership to conduct pricing on behalf of Queensland growers and millers, covering margin calls and associated fees so that its members can lock in sugar prices up to three years in advance.  QSL also operates a sophisticated pooling system, where growers can elect to have QSL manage and price GEI sugar on their behalf.

Financing: QSL uses its access to low-cost finance to provide year-round cash flow to members through a monthly proportional payment system called Advances. Under this system, QSL borrows approximately $150m each year to start paying members as soon as they start delivering sugar to the state’s terminals, even though that sugar may not be sold until up to a year later – hence the term Advance payment. As QSL is a not-for-profit, it also returns any net corporate profits to its members at the end of the financial year via the Advances system.

Marketing: QSL coordinates the physical sale of sugar, aiming to maximise returns to its members by optimising sales timing and customer premiums. They are highly regarded by their long-term clients in the Asian market, who pay strong premiums for Queensland’s reliable, high-quality sugar, last year coordinating the successful receipt of $1.9 billion in customer payments.

Logistics: QSL operates Queensland’s six Bulk Sugar Terminals on a cost-recovery basis, (i.e QSL doesn’t charge a margin), providing safe and efficient storage, handling and shipping of raw sugar as well as overseeing a strong quality management program. QSL’s delivery record is world-class, with over 98% of shipments delivered on time and in full last financial year.

While our circumstances might be a little different and it’s not been without its challenges, the sugar marketing model shows that there are other alternatives to the status quo for dairy.

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Do we care whether Australia makes less milk?

Could Australia be running out of milk? Dairy identity Darryl Cardona told the senate inquiry that we could be importing milk in two years. according to media reports. Wondering if this really could be possible and what difference it would make, I turned to Rabobank senior dairy analyst, Michael Harvey, for insight and am really grateful for his guest post below. Thanks Michael!

HARVEY_Michael_41961R

Michael Harvey, Rabobank

The Australian dairy industry is staring down the barrel of one of its largest annual falls in milk production and would follow a 2% decline last season. This season has begun with three consecutive months of double-digit falls and is forecast by commentators (including Rabobank) to finish the season down between 7-10%. One of the country’s worst droughts in history was the catalyst for a contraction in supply of 8% back in 2002/03 – a clear indication of how difficult it is right now.

The collapse in milk production is not surprising given the challenges being endured on-farm. Some producers are exiting the industry and the producers who remain are making strategic decision to quickly bring down their breakeven levels through reducing herds and cutting costs. Just to make matters worse, seasonal conditions present challenges for the second consecutive season (but for complete opposite reasons). Some dairying regions are faring better with seasonal conditions and less global market impact on milk prices – the steepest declines in production are from across the southern export regions.

Losing supply is risky for processors
So, what are the implications for the industry beyond the farmgate when facing a collapse in milk supply? For processors, losing a large volume of milk supply is risky business.

A loss of milk can have a material impact on profitability. This is through reduced efficiencies and higher overhead costs associated with running processing plants at less-than-optimal rates. The financial impact will depending on how much milk is lost, where from, and what the manufacturing footprint is to be able to spread the impact.

As has been well publicised, there is active recruiting of milk supply across southern Australia leaving Murray Goulburn the most exposed processor. For a processor the size of Murray Goulburn, a short-term loss of milk supply can be managed. However, losing a large quantity of milk in a rising price environment is not ideal. Furthermore, a more permanent loss of milk supply may require a review and resize of its manufacturing footprint (existing and planned) to meet the new supply realities.

Will Australia remain self-sufficient for milk?
Looking more widely, given the scope of the reduction this season, concerns are being raised at the ability of Australia to remain self-sufficient in milk and dairy. Entering this season, Australia was a net exporter of dairy and sold around 3.5 billion litres of milk (in liquid milk equivalents) into the global market.

But Australia is actively engaged in global trade and is an open economy. In the same year, Australia imported over 1 billion litres (in liquid milk equivalent) of dairy products and ingredients. A large portion of this was either cheese or butter for a use across retail, industrial and foodservice. Australia also imports ingredients that are in short supply locally. Examples include whey, casein and lactose for production of nutritional powders.

For most dairy processors, a drop in supply will mean an immediate reduction in exports because the domestic market delivers higher and more stable returns and supply is tied to contracts.  If Australia’s milk supply falls 10% this season that would equate to a loss of over 1 billion litres in just two seasons – a worrying trend for the entire industry.

Long-term a continued fall would trigger a spike in imports of more cheese, butter and ingredients to meet shortfalls and cover the loss of milk as processors focus on utilising local milk in the most profitable streams. But Australia would need to lose a lot more milk before needing to import liquid milk from New Zealand to meet the local consumer market for fresh dairy products.

What the future holds
So what can we expect moving forward? Firstly, better seasonal conditions over the remainder of the season would help to stem the loss of milk. Secondly, there are positive signs in global markets which have seen some improvement in farm-gate returns. Rabobank is confident of a sustained price recovery which will flow back to the farm gate. While it might be too late to have a more material impact of farmer margins this season, 2017/18 is shaping up well and should see a return to profitability on-farm. This would go a long way in stopping further bleeding of milk supply.

There is a risk for the whole of industry that Australia’s milk pool will remain stagnant or shrink further. Collectively the industry needs to re-ignite profitable milk supply growth. Australia needs at least 1% growth in milk production each year just to meet growing, albeit modestly, domestic market requirements.

Incentivising milk supply long-term to maximise help existing and planned processing capacity is more demanding. Restoring confidence and appetite for investment at the farm gate, which history shows for Australia, is an element difficult to attain and will require a sustained period of farmer profitability.

Without more milk supply, Australia will become less export focused, reducing its commitment to fast-growing global dairy markets, and potentially importing more ‘milk’.

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Fonterra, farmers and that fat profit

fonterraprofit

Fonterra rocked its Australian farmers last May with a price drop following Murray Goulburn’s own shock price announcement. I think it was fair to say nobody was surprised there was a drop – Fonterra had been signalling one for months – but the savagery of its execution left many farmers aghast and distraught.

Salt was added to the wound three weeks later when Fonterra chief executive Theo Spierings reportedly said:

“What we are doing is drive (sic) every cent of money which we can out of Australia back to New Zealand shareholders in this extremely low milk price environment,” he said.

“That is what we are doing everyday. And Australian business this year will be at a plus.”

Yesterday, the wound was opened afresh with Fonterra’s annual results headlined by a profit of $834 million after tax, including a healthy profit from the Australian division. With all this in mind, Milk Maid Marian asked Fonterra’s GM Australian Milk Supply, Matt Watt, some rather blunt questions. To his enormous credit, Matt had the following answers for us in less than 24 hours.

MMM: Fonterra Australia is very good at assessing farmer sentiment with its regular forums and Mood Meter surveys. How did the pricing changes announced in May affect the sentiment of farmers supplying Fonterra Australia?

MW: On the back of the shock and challenge that the price revision in May had to our farmers, we have seen a significant drop in farmer sentiment measures – that’s absolutely reflective of the discussions I’ve had over the phone and in person with our farmers and as has been fed back via our field team, BSC board and supplier forum.

MMM: How has sentiment changed since?
MW: Since opening price, we have seen a slight increase in sentiment. Importantly, the aspect that does rate positively is our field team interaction and support – we are proud of the work that the team does and, despite the surrounding circumstances, they continue to find ways to help our farmers through this period.

MMM: How much money did Fonterra Australia save by slashing the milk price in May and June?
MW: The milk price revision in May reduced our losses by around $40M which, on its own, enabled the Australian Ingredients business to get to around a break even position.

MMM: Given the reshaping of the Australian business was already well underway, why was it considered necessary to make the radical price cut?
MW: There has been significant effort and investment in the turnaround – we’ve divested loss-making businesses and non-core assets, such as our yoghurt and dairy desserts business, our Bega shares and our stake in Dairy Technical Services.

We reduced our working capital and our headcount, and undertook a program to drive efficiency throughout our business. However, the simple truth is, we were paying a milk price that was not being returned by the market, and that was impacting our profitability.

Our results today show improvement for the Australian business, which has contributed to the strong result for the Co-op, however, our turnaround is not complete and we need to continue to invest – our new, more efficient warehouse investment and further expansion of cheese capacity at Wynyard are examples of investments that have been made recently. Without a profitable business we compromise our ability to invest, risk devaluing the business, and risk our ability to provide sustainable returns right back to the farm gate.

MMM: What, if anything, do you regret about the decisions made in May?
MW: Whilst I can’t personally feel the impact on every single farm and the business and family circumstances, I am acutely aware of the massive impact that this decision had. In hindsight I often reflect as to how we could have more overtly communicated the disconnect between the Australian farm gate price and returns available in the market.

Having said that, the attempts that we did make about Australia not being immune to global challenges and that the milk price did not reflect what was being earned in the market had a discernible, negative impact on our supplier sentiment. We were accused of talking down the market.

MMM: How does Fonterra justify such harsh cuts while making a profit?
MW: While the milk price revision was regrettable, it is important that both our farmers and Fonterra have a model that ensures sustainable profitability.

The reality is that Australian milk price last year was not reflective of the global dairy commodity prices and around the world, all dairy farmers have experienced low farmgatge milk price. Our business is owned by farmers, and they have $1 billion of equity invested here. Last year these farmers received $3.90 per kgMS (NZD) in milk price plus a 40c per kgMS dividend on the back of the profit result. This takes them to $4.30 per kgMS (NZD) vs a final farm gate milk price of $5.13 (AUD) here in Australia.

MMM: Where have the 200 million extra litres come from?
MW: The new milk has largely come from MG farmers moving to supply Fonterra.

MMM: The presentation also says Fonterra Au’s outlook is to continue efforts to fill Darnum and notes that Stanhope will be online in 2017. How many more litres will be needed?
MW: The additional milk that we have brought on goes part way to meeting these needs. However, we continue to expect to see market opportunities continue to emerge, meaning that we will want to continue to grow volume, particularly in Northern Victoria.

MMM: The presentation says Fonterra Australia has gone from “Disconnect between milk price and reality” to “Market connected milk price”, yet Fonterra Australia is still bound by the Bonlac Supply Agreement to match or better the price of Australia’s largest processor. What are Fonterra plans in respect to that agreement?
MW: Our opening price and forecast close of $5.00 per kgMS reflects market conditions, but also is well above MG, the benchmark milk price. We remain committed to meeting our obligations under the BSC agreement, which is why, in 8 out of the last 10 years, we have paid a higher price than the BSC minimum commitment.

Thank you very much to Matt Watt, Fonterra’s GM Australian Milk Supply, for answering Milk Maid Marian’s questions.

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Why I welcomed Four Corners to our dairy

I’m looking forward to watching Four Corners tonight with all the enthusiasm of a patient awaiting the lancing of a boil. Will it be fun? No. Will it be good for me? I guess so.

It’s almost four months since Murray Goulburn called a trading halt, followed by the infamous “clawbacks” of both MG and Fonterra that rocked the dairy community.

In a state of confusion and panic, farmers called out for help. Ordinary Australians did what they could, ditching cheap unbranded milk in a show of solidarity with farmers that continues to hearten.

Four months on, panic has given way to a sense of aimlessness and loss. Helou and Tracy’s vision had offered a shining path towards security and prosperity but now Gary the Great has vanished and nobody has filled the role of white knight. Leadership is lacking at the time we need it most.

We farmers have a fleeting once-in-a-lifetime chance to fix things. Politicians want to know how they can help but we don’t seem to be able to articulate a coherent answer other than to cry for something, anything, to dull the pain.

Meanwhile, there’s a puerile optimism amongst some elites, reckoning that every casualty improves the prospects of the survivors. It’s a sentiment that disgusts me and simply doesn’t stack up.

Floods of milk generated by the powerhouses of Europe, NZ and the USA sink or float the export market – not the farm next door. We’ve already lost thousands of Aussie dairy farmers since deregulation. More of the same won’t solve our problems.

The first step towards a cure is to work out exactly what ails us and, at the moment, all we’re doing is bandaiding a festering sore. If there’s anybody who can sniff out and lance a boil, it’s Four Corners.

That’s why we welcomed Deb Whitmont and her team to our farm. Sure, I’ll be cringing on the couch but Four Corners’ Milked Dry might just reveal the bitter pill we need to swallow.

 

 

 

 

 

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The haves and have nots of Australian dairy

CowTongue

I’ve had requests from farmers, investors, the media and even politicians for an explanation of how milk prices work (or don’t). I’m going to start with the factors that affect the price a dairy farmer in Australia’s south-eastern states receives.

  1. Who buys Old Macdonald’s milk?

The opening prices of most of the processors are in:

ACM $5.30
Bega $5.00
Lion (variable option) $5.00
NDP $5.00
Warrnambool Cheese & Butter $4.80
Fonterra $4.73
Longwarry $4.60
Burra Foods $4.40 to $4.60
Murray Goulburn $4.31
ADFC To be advised

It’s a massive spread of prices, with the top almost 25 per cent higher than the bottom. And it doesn’t stop there. The pricing systems are incredibly complex, with the prices no more than weighted averages. I know of a farmer supplying MG, for instance, who will receive just $3.79kg MS for his milk. I’ll explain that later in this post.

But, why, you ask, doesn’t Old Macdonald simply choose the buyer with the highest price?

It’s easy to change factories. You just call, make an appointment, fill in some forms and voila, a new sign hangs on the gate! But the reality is that there are lots of other factors in play:

  • Not all processors collect milk in every region. ACM, for example, does not collect milk from Milk Maid Marian’s district.
  • Many farmers are tied up with debts to their current processor or incentives for flat milk supply that would see them penalised tens of thousands of dollars for leaving.
  • Some farmers are contractually bound to the processor as part of share acquisition or “Next Gen” programs.
  • Then, there’s the waiting list. Processors tell me that since the opening prices were announced, there are hundreds of millions of litres of milk on waiting lists for new homes right now. The processors will cherry-pick those that suit their ideal profiles. In fact, many processors already have too much milk and have simply closed their books.

2. The breed of cows and what they’re fed
As a rule of thumb, if you’re not familiar with this industry pricing, you can convert prices expressed in kilograms of milk solids (kg MS) into cents per litre (cpl) by dividing by 13. So, $5.30 per kg of milk solids equates to 41 cents per litre and $4.31 equates to 33 cents.

It’s a formula that works pretty well for the 80% of Australian dairy cows that are the classic black-and-white Holsteins.

But not if your cows are Jerseys. Around 11% of Australian dairy cows are Jerseys, which produce around 30% less milk than Holstein Friesians but a lot more fat for every litre. According to ADHIS statistics, HF cows’ milk contains an average 3.83% butterfat and 3.24% protein, while Jersey milk is creamier at 4.76 % fat and 3.67 % protein. This means that returns from Jerseys appear higher than those of HF in terms of cpl and lower in terms of dollars per kg MS.

3. When the cows give the most milk
Every cow produces no milk for two months until she calves, then her milk production increases steeply for a couple of months before tapering off again. We call this her “lactation curve” and when you add together all the herd members’ curves, you get a farm’s “milk supply curve”.

It makes sense to have the herd’s milk production peak when there is the most grass in the paddocks. Inevitably, that’s in Spring. Of course, if all herds peaked in Spring, it would cause big trouble for the processors. The entire Australian dairy milk supply is getting less and less seasonal over time because the processors offer more money for “off peak” milk.

Here’s an excerpt from my own farm’s income estimate to show you just how much the price changes over the year with Fonterra.

FonterraTotal

For MG suppliers, the shift can be far more dramatic if suppliers elect to provide “flat milk” but I would need to dedicate a blog post to explaining this aspect of its system.

The differences in payment systems mean that even if a farm receives the average milk price from one processor, it might not from another.

4. Compulsory charges and levies
Most processors have compulsory charges that come off the headline price. These are not trivial and amount to tens of thousands of dollars. In my farm’s case, we pay a transport levy that amounts to 35 cents for every kilogram of milk solids we sell. On top of these, there are Dairy Australia and Dairy Food Safety Victoria levies.

5. Bonuses for the big and beautiful
If you think you’re across all that, don’t forget there are productivity incentives that favour larger farms and MG still has a growth incentive for farms supplying more milk than the year before. These can be very significant. There are also quality bonuses (and/or penalties) with different processors having different benchmarks.

6. Clawbacks
As you might already know, both MG and Fonterra dramatically dropped their prices for May and June to bring back the overall price. They have both come up with “support packages” for suppliers. Farmers are now beginning to pay for those. Fonterra suppliers are on interest-only this year and principal repayments will begin in the next financial year. MG suppliers are paying off their packages in the form of an artificially-lowered milk price already.

7. Special deals
Farmers were outraged back in 2012 when it was revealed that even the co-op was offering special deals for the really big farms. Nobody can say for sure how common these are today.

The bottom line is that every farmer needs to get an individual income estimate from processors to be sure what their milk price really is and what it would be if they supplied a different factory. Not all milk is created equal.

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Who wants to sue who and who will pay?

DevondaleTwirl

One of the first things farmers asked about the Murray Goulburn and Fonterra announcements was: “Can they really do this? Is it legal?”.

The lawyers have duly arrived.

I know of three firms circling Murray Goulburn right now. While Slater & Gordon was the first to announce it was opening an investigation into a class action against MG, it has not yet confirmed whether it will proceed.

Last week, a so-called “maverick” lawyer, Mark Elliott, reportedly filed a class action against MG on behalf of unit holders who had bought shares in the listed part of MG.

At the same time, another lawyer, David Burstyner of Adley Burstyner working together with Harwood Andrews, is building a list of farmers affected by the sudden milk price collapse who might be interested in one or more of the three legal strategies:

  • a “group claim” against a range of processors to recover financial loss;
  • steps to change and take back control of MG management, and;
  • an urgent court order stopping the claw back.

The big question on farmers’ lips is: if MG gets sued, won’t farmers ultimately pay the price?

The stakes are high because MG farmers face a double whammy:

  1. Now more than ever, farmers are acutely aware that when processors don’t do well, the answer is to slash the price paid to farmers.
  2. Every farmer who supplies milk to MG must own MG shares, so its falling share price is robbing many retirement nest eggs. Some are even facing margin calls on loans they took out to buy more shares.

The targets
The Elliott class action is targeting the MG unit trust and its directors. The good news is that the trust and directors should already have insurance that deals with such a claim.

There’s likely, however, to be an excess they will have to pay, which the lawyers call “deductibles”, which means the insured party has to cover part of the loss out of its own resources as “self insurance”.

On top of that, director’s insurance is no silver bullet. This type of insurance is complex and it’s quite possible that out of court settlements won’t be covered.

The proposed action from David Burstyner could target any of the processors who stepped down: MG, Fonterra, Lion and NDP. Mr Burstyner expects to know in the next few weeks. If launched, class actions usually play out over several years, so buckle yourselves in.

Will it help farmers?
Because there’s likely to be plenty of coverage of the Elliott class action for unit holders, I’m concentrating on the Adley Burstyner proposal for farmers and its potential impact on MG, the hybrid co-op.

Speaking with Milk Maid Marian on the weekend, Mr Burstyner said his firm is investigating an injunction to halt the milk price drops.

“An injunction is difficult to secure but the situation is urgent,” he said. “We are prepared to try if it is achievable, but it depends on what we learn from farmers”.

He also plans a “group claim” against processor(s) funded by a litigation funder, which roughly works on what some people call a no win no fee arrangement (see more at http://www.adleyburstyner.com.au/group-claim-faq). This arrangement minimises the risk to participating farmers but, as a guide, around 30% of the proceeds after costs is likely to go to funders. Mr Burstyner said the participation of thousands of farmers is necessary but that it’s possible because more than 3000 supply MG and Fonterra alone.

At the same time, Mr Burstyner said he hopes there will be no need for “all-out war” and that a class action could be avoided with the processors reaching a settlement with farmers that could also improve the way milk prices are set in future.

MG, however, is not a normal company. The fundamental ways it interacts with farmers must be put to co-op members and voted on rather than hastily negotiated on the court house steps.

But what if “all-out war” is the only option? Mr Burstyner acknowledged the possibility of short-term pain for the processor (which may carry through to its supplier shareholders) but the long-term benefit would be a “clean up” of the industry.

Asked why farmer shareholders could not simply reshape their co-operative by voting on special resolutions rather than litigation, Mr Burstyner strongly agreed that strategies along those lines could be very useful, saying, “Although MG is no longer the cooperative it was prior to July 2015, we would like to assist farmers with the solutions which could be possible in the newly formed corporatised structure, using farmers’ significant rights as shareholders which we think could really improve their position.”.

In notes he offered to Milk Maid Marian, Mr Burstyner clarified his point:

o    Murray Goulburn Co-operative Co Limited ACN 004 277 089 is an unlisted public company. It is controlled by its shareholders who for present purposes are the farmers. MG is no longer the same cooperative structure it was before July 2015.

o    Shareholders with more than 5% of votes can call a meeting or ask the company to call one.

o    They can sack the board and appoint alternatives by ordinary resolution.

o    There is a 2-month notice requirement for certain resolutions, for example, sacking board members.

o    The Company (under new management) may even be able to bring a claim against former Directors for not satisfying their director’s duties.

Mr Burstyner is keen to hear from farmers who would like to be kept updated on these three types of potential legal action (in the short term an injunction or challenging management, or the long term solution of a class action to recover financial loss and bring about systemic changes).

You can register your interest at http://www.adleyburstyner.com.au/farmers-farm-gate-milk-price-action.

Mr Burstyner stressed that he has no interest in any legal strategies if farmers don’t want them. Without interest from significant numbers of farmers, Adley Burstyner and Harwood Andrews will close their file.

Important: this post is general commentary only, please seek legal advice before considering any action.

 

 

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Why the system is broken

The interaction between processors and farmers is bizarre to outsiders. The way it works is this:

Out of a handful of processors in the district, you ask one to collect your milk, although, if you’re unlucky and live somewhere a little remote, you might not actually have a choice at all. We’ll call this processor “your” processor for convenience.

Whichever processor you choose, they tell you what they will pay for your milk on July 1 – sometimes after July 1. This “opening price” is meant to be the lowest anticipated price, the one you can budget on. The only other time the price has fallen below the opening price in the last couple of decades was during the global financial crisis and even then we had a couple of months’ notice.

The price generally goes up along the way from there, though, unless you are one of the very few farmers who gets a fixed price, nothing is actually guaranteed after that.

It all depends on the exchange rate, global commodity prices, the performance of the biggest processor in the market and the success of “your” processor’s particular product mix.

What’s the performance of the biggest processor in the market and the success of your processor’s particular product mix got to do with the amount farmers are paid, you ask? Everything.

And it’s a system that used to work brilliantly. Once upon a time – not too long ago for those sporting the odd grey hair – there were not one but two major dairy co-operatives in the southern states: Bonlac and Murray Goulburn.

Every cent of profit the two co-operatives earned was returned to their farmer-shareholders and, because their whole reason for being was to maximise profits for their farmers, they effectively set a base for the farm-gate milk price.

Neither co-op could get too lazy or arrogant because there was strong competition from the other. Then, disaster struck, as reported by The Age:

“Crucially, Bonlac is processing only 1.6 billion litres of milk. Over the past 10 years, its share of Victorian milk production has declined from about 40 per cent in 1992 to 16 per cent in 2002.”

“Bonlac’s milk plants are running at only 75 per cent of manufacturing capacity. Particularly underused are the factories at Darnum in West Gippsland and Stanhope in northern Victoria.

“Debt, the result of an ambitious expansion into value-adding branded products in the 1990s, is still crippling the company, despite asset sales creating paper profits in the last couple of years, and the repayment of $185 million of debt.”

Now, in the midst of an ambitious expansion into value-adding branded products on the back of a partial listing, MG is in turmoil. Its MD and CFO have resigned and the milk price has collapsed, triggering ASIC and ACCC investigations, at least one class action and a share price meltdown.

Bonlac is long gone and, in the eyes of many farmers, MG has lost the title of reliable pacemaker. The system is broken.

It’s no longer acceptable for dairy leaders to tell farmers to concentrate on their farm businesses and blindly follow their calls for growth. It’s time we actively forged a new era for Australian dairying.

 

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